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Non-technical Summary 
Policymakers in the U.S. and abroad are engaged in an ongoing debate about the proper role of 
government in the development of scientific and technical knowledge.  The debate centers on 
how much public money should be spent on scientific research and on which areas of research 
should receive funding.  Policymakers who support public funding believe this research creates 
knowledge that complements private industry R&D investment by providing new ideas for 
products or processes or by helping firms to solve technical problems with their existing projects.  
On the other side, those who want to discontinue or reduce public funding believe this research 
substitutes for private R&D investment by drawing important research inputs out of the private 
sector or by funding a project that would otherwise have been pursued by industry firms.  
This paper sheds light on the relationship between publicly financed biomedical research, which 
is performed mainly in university and non-profit research labs, and the investment behavior of 
private pharmaceutical firms.  The main question in the paper asks if public basic and clinical 
research complement private industry R&D.  An increase in industry investment in response to 
public research is strong evidence supporting a complementary relationship.   
New micro-level data on public research investment by the U.S. National Institutes of Health 
allow measures of basic and clinical research in seven medical areas to be included in a 
distributed lag model explaining pharmaceutical R&D investment.  These data are combined 
with data on pharmaceutical global R&D investment and sales to analyze the relationship 
between public and private R&D investment within technology areas over time. 
The analysis finds strong evidence that both public basic and clinical research are 
complementary to pharmaceutical R&D and, thereby, stimulate private industry investment.  
However, differences in the importance and degree of scientific and market uncertainty between 
basic and clinical public research lead to differences in the magnitude and timing of the 
pharmaceutical investment response.  The results indicate that a dollar increase in public basic 
research stimulates an additional $8.38 in pharmaceutical investment after eight years. The 
industry R&D response to public clinical research is smaller in magnitude and shorter in duration 
with a dollar increase in public clinical research stimulating an additional $2.35 in 
pharmaceutical investment over a three year period.  
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1 Introduction 
 Policymakers in the U.S. and abroad are engaged in an ongoing debate about the 
proper role of government in the development of scientific and technical knowledge.  The 
debate centers on how much public money should be spent on scientific research and on 
which areas of research should receive funding.  Policymakers who support public funding 
believe this research creates knowledge that complements private industry R&D investment.  
They view this research, which is performed predominantly in universities and non-profit 
institutions, as providing new ideas for products or processes or as helping firms to solve 
technical problems with their existing projects.  On the other side, those who want to 
discontinue or reduce funding believe public research substitutes for private R&D 
investment.  They believe this research crowds-out private investment by drawing important 
research inputs out of the private sector or simply substitutes for private R&D by funding a 
project that would otherwise have been pursued by industry firms. (David et al. 2000a, 
2000b) 
Recognizing that complementarity and substitutability may happen concurrently and 
along dimensions that are not completely observable or measurable, existing research focuses 
on estimating the “net” effect of publicly funded R&D on private R&D.  In a recent survey of 
the econometric evidence accumulated over the past 35 years, David et al. (2000a) report that 
most studies find complementarity, however, the overall literature is mixed and 
inconclusive.
1
  The authors point out that the net effect found in many studies depends 
critically on the nature of the public research under investigation as well as the particular 
technological opportunity and appropriability conditions facing private firms.   
This paper addresses the heterogeneity in publicly funded research and industry 
response by specifying an empirical model of R&D investment by the pharmaceutical 
industry across medical technology classes.  Focusing on the pharmaceutical industry 
eliminates variation from inter-industry differences in technological opportunities and 
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appropriability conditions while distinguishing between medical technology classes addresses 
heterogeneity in opportunities across scientific areas of research.  Similar to previous work 
(Wiggins 1983, Jaffe 1989, Ward and Dranove 1995) this distinction makes it possible to 
analyze the relationship between public and private R&D investment within technology areas 
over time.   
The data and econometric improvements used this paper set it apart from the existing 
research by Ward and Dranove (1995).  Unique and comprehensive grant and contract award 
data covering all of the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding allow accurate 
measurement of public research investments into medical areas.  For each medical class, 
these data allow public biomedical research funding to be separated by character of research 
into basic “laboratory” research and clinical “human” research.  This is a significant 
advantage because pharmaceutical industry investment responds differently depending on the 
character of public research in question.  Econometrically, the analysis addresses the 
endogeneity of industry sales in the R&D investment decision using exogenous measures of 
hospital admissions and mortality as instrumental variables. 
Using 2SLS on a panel of seven medical classes over the 1981-1997 period, the 
estimation results show that both public basic and clinical research complement private 
pharmaceutical R&D.  However, pharmaceutical investment responds differently to each type 
of public research.  For public basic research, which is characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty in its scientific “maturity’ and its potential market applicability, changes in 
pharmaceutical investment have a “U” shape.  Firms respond quickly to new information 
from public basic research then, after a period of holding the level of investment constant and 
allowing scientific and market uncertainties to resolve, firms again increase private R&D 
investment.  This finding is consistent with established theory on investment under 
uncertainty described by Pindyck (1991) and Dixit (1992).  The long-run elasticity estimate is 
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1.69 and suggests a dollar increase in public basic research stimulates an additional $8.38 of 
industry R&D investment after eight years.   
Relative to basic research, public clinical research has very little scientific or market 
uncertainty and this difference is reflected in the timing of the pharmaceutical investment 
response.  The industry R&D response to public clinical research is shorter in duration and 
smaller in magnitude.  The results suggest that firms increase private R&D investment in 
response to public clinical research within the first three years with no significant impact 
thereafter.  The long-run elasticity estimate is 0.40 and suggests a dollar increase in public 
clinical research stimulates an additional $2.35 of industry R&D investment after three years.   
The paper begins with a discussion of the interaction between public and private 
research drawn mainly from case study evidence on pharmaceutical innovation.  Section III 
outlines the empirical model of pharmaceutical investment while section IV discusses the 
data.  Section V presents the estimation results and section VI contains concluding remarks.   
 
2 Interaction between Public Research and Pharmaceutical R&D 
 How public scientific research influences private R&D depends on the nature of the 
research problems that industry scientists face in the pharmaceutical innovative process.  
There are two stages in this process, called drug discovery and drug development, and each 
stage involves a unique set of research activities.  Drug discovery or “pre-clinical” research 
involves a wide spectrum of laboratory and non-human research activities ranging from 
identification of new drug concepts through to animal models and compound patenting.  
Having identified a promising new compound, drug development follows this stage with a 
full set of human clinical trials to determine compound safety and efficacy before seeking 
product approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
2
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Paralleling this division of industry research, public research investment can also be 
separated by character of research activity.
3
  Basic or “fundamental” biomedical research can 
be broadly defined as bench-level laboratory research directed at the discovery and 
characterization of physiologically active substances and the definition of metabolic 
pathways related to normal and disease function.  Public clinical biomedical research is 
patient-oriented research involving human subjects, including epidemiological research but 
excluding social, behavioral, occupational, and health services research.
4
  
In both pharmaceutical research stages, the overall influence of public research will 
be determined by the degree to which industry scientists draw from and add to public 
scientific knowledge.  Since it is not feasible to observe, measure and aggregate across 
individual scientists to calculate a “net flow” of knowledge from public research to industry 
R&D, the interpretation of the direction and magnitude established by statistical methods 
must rely on insights gained from case studies.
5
  
There is a substantial body of case study research that describes a predominantly 
complementary relationship between private industry R&D investment and public basic 
research.
6
  Most of this research highlights the role that basic research plays in opening up 
new avenues to therapeutic outcomes.  It is useful to think of the new therapies being pursued 
by industry scientists as “therapeutic jigsaw puzzles” that must be completed before any new 
drug treatment can be taken to the market.  Using this analogy, public basic research is 
providing either completely new puzzles or it is “resurrecting” puzzles that were previously 
believed to be unsolvable.  In either situation, almost all of the case studies characterize the 
new puzzles emerging out of public basic research as “embryonic.” (Colyvas 2002)  These 
puzzles are in their early stages of scientific development and may only embody the faintest 
outline of a promising new therapy.  A key takeaway from these studies is that public basic 
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research is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty in both its scientific “maturity” and 
its potential market applicability.   
Beyond supplying new ideas for therapies, public basic research can contribute to 
industry solutions by providing “puzzle pieces” or by providing the clues required for 
discovering new pieces.  In the case studies, these pieces and clues take the form of methods 
for identifying target compounds, validating these targets, scaling-up the quantities for animal 
and human testing, as well as laboratory models for animal studies.  (OTA 1993, Cockburn 
and Henderson 1997, NIH 2000, Arora and Gambardellla 1994, Gambardella 1995)  Because 
of the complexity and diversity of the puzzles confronting industry scientists, the pieces 
drawn from public basic research are rarely the “plug and play” variety.  Information from 
this research must be “shaped” to fit the specific puzzle under investigation.  Moreover, when 
public basic research only provides clues, new pieces must be invented to fit the puzzle.
7
   
While most observers believe that public clinical research is complementary to 
industry research, there is relatively little case study evidence shedding light on this 
interaction.
8
  The most specific type of clinical research, the drug trial, is a pure substitute for 
private industry research.  At least with respect to a specific compound, a publicly supported 
clinical trial allows the industry to use their R&D resources elsewhere.  If, for instance, a 
particular compound is shown to be toxic or ineffective, industry researchers do not need to 
spend additional funds to duplicate that research.  This being said, the knowledge gained 
about a compound’s absorption, toxicity, elimination, side-effect, and efficacy profile may 
provide valuable information to industry scientists.  Using the specific knowledge gained 
from a publicly supported clinical trial, industry researchers might investigate a modified 
compound from the same “chemical family” or a modified dosage regime and find a safe and 
effective drug.   
Cockburn and Henderson (1997) and others point out that publicly supported clinical 
research plays an important role in the process of finding new uses for older drugs.  If 
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promising new indications are revealed from early phase clinical trials performed in the 
public sector, the industry may choose to pursue the full complement of clinical trials 
necessary for FDA approval.  This type of complementarity may also arise in cases where the 
expected market value of a new use is low due to a high degree of uncertainty.  Gelijns et al. 
(1998) suggest that public sector clinical researchers may have an important role to play in 
reducing uncertainty and perhaps facilitating the adoption of new drug candidates by industry 
firms.  Moreover, public epidemiologic studies help the industry gauge demand for new 
therapies in the patient population.  These alternative types of public clinical research are 
likely to stimulate additional investment by the industry.  
The most recent empirical contribution looking directly at the relationship between 
public and private R&D investment is Ward and Dranove (1995).
9
  Their analysis relates 
pharmaceutical investment to NIH research obligations using a panel of five therapeutic 
classes observed between 1970 and 1988.  The authors’ data did not allow them to 
differentiate between basic and clinical research.  Instead, they use total financial obligations 
by National Institute (such as the National Cancer Institute, the National Heart Lung and 
Blood Institute, and so on) as a measure of public “basic” research in each therapeutic area.  
Unfortunately, NIH obligations by institute are a diverse set of financial commitments 
including basic, clinical, administrative, training, demonstration, construction, and other 
activities.  Their main finding indicates that a 1% increase in NIH research obligations leads 
to an increase in industry R&D of 0.6% to 0.7 % after a lag of seven years.   
 
3 The Model of Pharmaceutical Investment 
 The empirical model of pharmaceutical R&D presented below follows the investment 
framework described in David et al. (2000a).  This framework is commonly used in the 
literature and has been applied to pharmaceutical investment using firm level data by 
Grabowski et al. (1980, 2000) and industry level data by Giaccotto (2004).  The model 
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postulates that the level of investment is determined by the interaction between the marginal 
cost of capital (MCC) and the marginal rate of return (MRR).  Factors that affect the 
availability of funds, such as sales revenue and interest rates, determine the shape and 
position of the MCC schedule.  Factors that affect the demand, cost, and probability of 
success in research, such as health status, FDA regulatory stringency, and public scientific 
knowledge, determine the shape and position of the MRR schedule.  Together, the 
equilibrium level of investment is determined.  
 In the empirical model used here, this framework is specified across medical 
technology classes.  The factors affecting the availability of funds include gross revenues 
from sales and dummy variables to account for differences across classes and shifts over time 
due to, among other things, changes in the cost of capital.  The factors that affect the returns 
to industry investment include measures of demand, proxies for basic and clinical public 
scientific knowledge, FDA regulation, and dummy variables to account for differences across 
classes and shifts over time due to, among other things, changes in drug regulations.   The 
reduced form fixed effects model for an individual therapeutic class, i, in year, t, is:   
Equation (1): 
 
Iit is industry R&D investment in therapeutic class, i, and year, t and Sit-1 is sales revenue in 
class, i, in the previous year, t-1.  Gross sales revenue is a measure of the availability of funds 
for R&D investment and is lagged one year to reflect the pharmaceutical budgeting process 
(Grabowski 2000).10  Bit-j is a distributed lag of public basic research investment in class, i, 
and year, t-j.  Cit-j is a distributed lag of public clinical research investment in class, i, and 
year, t-j.  The data allow these distributed lags to extend back nine years prior to industry 
investment.   
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Rit-1 is a measure of FDA regulatory stringency.  Dit represents a group of drug demand 
measures for class, i, and year, t.  A sub-group of these measures, the ones that have no effect 
on industry R&D, are potential instruments for industry sales.  The therapeutic class 
unobserved effect is ai and the time dummies are γt.  εit is an idiosyncratic error with the 
standard properties. 
 In order to estimate equation (1), the industry R&D series must be weakly dependent.  
However, using a standard Dickey-Fuller test, it is not possible to reject the null that industry 
R&D is a unit root process.
11
  High persistence in the pharmaceutical investment series is 
hardly surprising when one remembers that it takes an average of twelve to fifteen years to 
develop a new drug.
12
  To make the series weakly dependent, the analysis uses the log-
difference estimator.  Differencing the equation eliminates the therapeutic class fixed effects 
and specifies the equation in growth rates.  The new estimating equation (2) is:    
 
The main hypotheses are that public basic and clinical research complement industry 
R&D investment in the long-run.  To reduce multicollinearity and smooth the private 
investment response, the finite distributed lags for public basic and clinical research are 
restricted to lie on a 2nd degree polynomial.  These are commonly referred to as Almon lags.
13
  
Across time, the estimated  lag coefficients may be investment stimulating (positive lag 
coefficient) or investment saving (negative lag coefficient) for the industry depending on the 
nature and evolution of research projects in each sector.  The long-run elasticity is calculated 
as the sum of the statistically significant lag coefficients.  A positive long-run elasticity is 
interpreted as evidence supporting complementarity where public research stimulates 
additional private pharmaceutical investment.  A negative long-run elasticity, however, is not 
conclusive evidence for substitution.  Substitution has the additional requirement that firms 
∑ ∑
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would have undertaken the research themselves and this cannot be determined from the 
available data.   
In equation (2), growth in sales, ∆ln(Sales), should be viewed as endogenous.  A 
common rule-of-thumb for industry executives is to set R&D investment as a fixed 
proportion of sales. (Grabowski et al. (1980, 2000))  Moreover, in a review of research in this 
area, Scherer (1996) points out that industry R&D growth may simply reflect an endogenous 
response to “the actual rise in gross profitability” instead of changes in response to “richer 
technological opportunities.”  (Scherer (1996), p. 269)  Scherer (2001) explores this 
relationship further using industry time-series data and finds a positive relationship between 
gross profitability and R&D spending.  Moreover, the causation runs in the opposite direction 
as well.  R&D spending ultimately feeds back to determine sales revenue.  This feedback is a 
violation of the strict exogeneity assumption needed for consistency of estimators. 
To correct for endogeneity, I need instruments that do not belong in the industry R&D 
investment equation (2) but are also highly correlated with industry sales.  Valid instruments 
may come from the group of hospital admissions and mortality demand measures as long as 
they meet these two conditions.  In the empirical section, I use a two-step approach.  First I 
determine the potential set of instruments from the demand variables by finding out which of 
these variables are appropriately excluded from the investment model.  Next, from the set of 
potential instruments, I determine which of these has a strong partial correlation with 
pharmaceutical sales.  Any demand measures that meet these criteria are valid instruments.  It 
is important to recognize that the instruments are determined exogenously in the patient 
population and are not under the direct control of the pharmaceutical R&D decision makers.  
For the empirical model, I assume these measures are strictly exogenous.   
While the empirical model used in this paper improves on the current literature, there 
are two modeling limitations that should be noted and addressed in future research. First, 
better data would allow one to estimate a structural model that explicitly characterizes the 
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channels through which public research and private R&D interact.  At this point, research 
efforts intended to explore the channels such as publications, personal networks, and so on, 
face significant data limitations.  The model in this paper treats the channels as an implicit 
“black box.”
14
   
Second, the model assumes that public research investment is exogenous to the 
private R&D decision by pharmaceutical firms.  This is reasonable since pharmaceutical 
R&D decision makers have no direct control over the quantity or allocation of Federal 
research funding.  Based on the lags in the model, public research is clearly a predetermined 
variable; however, the assumption does rule out feedback from current industry R&D to 
future public research investment.  Failure of this strict exogeneity assumption can lead to 
inconsistency of the estimators.  These limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the empirical results.  
 
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 To estimate the impact of public basic and clinical research on industry investment, I 
use a panel of 7 medical therapeutic classes with observations running from 1981-1997.    
The therapeutic classes are defined by the U.S Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census.  
This classification scheme has been used by the industry to group R&D and sales data since 
the early 1960s.  Seven therapeutic classes are considered:  endocrine/neoplasm (cancer), 
central nervous system, cardiovascular, anti-infective, gastro-intestinal/genito-urinary, 
dermatologic, and respiratory.   
The empirical analysis uses public investment into basic and clinical research as 
proxies for the generation of scientific knowledge.  The proxies are defined using detailed 
data on grant and contract awards by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
particularly the NIH.  The NIH is the largest public agency supporting biomedical research in 
the world.  Their total budget for FY 2003 is $27.3 billion, an increase of $4.2 billion over the 
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FY 2002 budget.  Further, the American Association for the Advancement of Science reports 
that the NIH is the second largest public agency supporting R&D in the U.S. after the 
Department of Defense and the largest agency supporting undirected or “basic” research. 
(AAAS 2001)   
While the limitations of using investment flows to proxy for knowledge generation 
are well known, investment flows have at least three advantages over other measures of 
knowledge creation.  First, other indicators such as patent and publication counts, perhaps 
weighted by citations, capture only one form of codified knowledge.  At least in principle, 
investment proxies are general enough to capture all forms of knowledge creation, either 
codified or tacit.  Second, investment flows are not restricted to any particular channel of 
dissemination.  Only looking at published papers, on the other hand, misses public research 
flows that happen through conferences, networks or consulting.  Third, other indicators of 
research output are not under the control of policymakers whereas the allocation of public 
funds for research is one of the most important policy tools available.    
The investment proxies for public basic and clinical research knowledge are defined 
using the CRISP database (Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects) 
maintained by the NIH and covering the years 1972-1996.  These data contain specific 
information about each biomedical grant and contract awarded by the NIH and other agencies 
in the DHHS.  A multistage procedure was used to separate these data by character of 
research (basic, clinical, other) and further allocate grants and contracts to therapeutic classes.  
(Refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of the procedure.)  This process results in 
seven public basic research flows and seven clinical research flows for every year in the 
CRISP database for 1972-1996.  These flows are deflated using the NIH Biomedical 
Research and Development Price Index (BRDPI) maintained by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (base year is 2000).  Figure 1 shows the broad level breakout of the complete 
CRISP database into basic, clinical, and other research types in real dollars.  Figures 2, 3, and 
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4 plot the real flows of industry R&D and the real flows of public basic and clinical research 
for three of the seven therapeutic classes over the 1980 to 1996 period. 
Pharmaceutical industry investment and sales by therapeutic class were gathered from 
various years of the Annual Survey report published by Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers Association (PhRMA).  The R&D data correspond to PhRMA member R&D 
investment in the U.S. and abroad.  The sales figures correspond to total industry sales, 
including non-PhRMA members, in the U.S. and sales of U.S. companies abroad.  The 
nominal flows were deflated using the BLS Producer Price Index for Pharmaceutical 
Preparations (base year is 2000). 
 Regulatory stringency proxies by therapeutic class and year are constructed using data 
from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  Following Wiggins (1983), the proxy is 
defined to be the average delay in months between the date of submission of a New Drug 
Application and the date of FDA marketing approval.  If more than one compound is 
approved in a particular therapeutic class, then the regulatory delay variable is an arithmetic 
average of the observed review periods.  For instance, if a therapeutic class has two approved 
drugs in a particular year, one with a ten-month delay and another with a fourteen month 
delay, then the delay period used in the analysis would be twelve months.  This averaging 
methodology is intended to capture how pharmaceutical firms adjust their expectations of 
FDA regulatory review.  
 The demand variables and potential instruments are hospital admissions and mortality 
rates by therapeutic class and year in five age groups.  These data were gathered from the 
National Center for Health Statistics and grouped into therapeutic classes using the ICD-9-
CM (International Classification of Diseases Ninth Edition, Clinical Modification).  
Classification was performed at the 3-digit diagnosis level for each of the five age groups:  
less than 35 years old, 35-44 years old, 45-54 years old, 55-64 years old, and 65 and older.  
For each therapeutic class and age group, the hospital admission rates come from the 
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National Hospital Discharge survey and are defined per 1000 population.  Similarly, the 
mortality rates come from the National Vital Statistics System, multiple-cause-of-death file, 
and are defined per 1000 population.   
 
5 Estimation Results and Discussion 
 The empirical analysis takes place in two steps.  The first step consists of three pooled 
OLS regressions that are used to determine which variables belong in the model.  This is a 
necessary first step since it is unknown which of the hospital admissions and mortality 
demand variables are potential instruments for pharmaceutical sales.  If these variables have a 
significant effect on pharmaceutical R&D, then they should not be excluded from the model 
and are not valid IV candidates.  Having determined the IV candidates and verified their 
partial correlation with pharmaceutical sales, the second step in the analysis consists of three 
pooled 2SLS regressions.   
Before turning to the actual estimates, it is also important to recall that the lag 
distributions for public basic and clinical research are specified as 2nd degree polynomials.
15
  
The coefficient estimates for the quadratic polynomial terms are reported in the tables.  The 
implied lag coefficient estimates and their statistical significance will be reported and 
discussed for the final specification of the 2SLS model.  In Tables II and III, the explanatory 
variables that are statistically significant are shown in boldface.  The bottom of each table 
lists various regression diagnostics.  
Columns (1)-(3) of Table II report the OLS regression results.  Column (1) contains 
the “fully specified” model that includes all of the available explanatory variables including 
year time dummies.  Since the year time dummies are not jointly or individually significant, 
the model in column (2) replaces these with a time trend.  Model (3) cleans up the 
specification by dropping the other insignificant regressors.   
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Looking across the regressions in Table II, it is evident that both public basic and 
clinical research significantly impact the growth of pharmaceutical R&D investment.  The 
quadratic specification works well for public basic research, however, both the linear and 
quadratic terms are insignificant for public clinical research.  This will be addressed in the 
2SLS regressions in Table III.  Growth in pharmaceutical sales is significant in models (2) 
and (3) when the time dummies are dropped and replaced with a linear time trend.  The 
insignificance of industry sales in model (1) is probably due to multicollinearity between 
industry sales and the time dummies.  The effect of FDA regulatory delay, which is a proxy 
for regulatory stringency, is not economically or statistically significant in either model (1) or 
(2) and is dropped in model (3).   
As for the patient demand variables, four of the ten are significant.  The results 
indicate that pharmaceutical R&D investment increases strongly in response to the health 
conditions of people in the 55-64 year old age group.  These are the conditions driving 
increases in hospital admissions and mortality.  However, growth in pharmaceutical R&D 
falls in response to greater hospital admissions for people over sixty-four.  It is difficult to 
know exactly why this occurs but it could reflect that fact that hospital admissions for the 
oldest people are for conditions that are not amenable to drug therapy.  Also, growth in 
pharmaceutical investment decreases with higher mortality rates in those individuals between 
35 and 44 years old.  This probably reflects the fall in expected returns to investment as these 
potential customers are lost.  
While the OLS regressions are the proper place to start, Scherer and others note that 
the volume of pharmaceutical sales is an endogenous variable in a pharmaceutical investment 
model.  On the one hand, increases in sales lead to greater R&D investment, either by 
providing internal funds for investment or by capturing expected demand; on the other hand, 
current R&D leads to future sales.  Of the six potential IV candidates identified in the first 
step of this analysis, hospital admissions for people less than 35 years old is the only valid 
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IV.  This variable has strong partial correlation with pharmaceutical sales in a first stage 
regression with a t-statistic of -2.19 and a p-value < 0.03 while the other variables have no 
significant partial correlation with sales.  Consequently, one valid instrument is available and 
the 2SLS regressions presented in Table III are just-identified.   
Columns (1)-(3) of Table III report the 2SLS regression results.  Column (1) uses the 
same specification as model (3) of Table II.  As is typical in an instrumental variables 
regression, the standard errors are larger than the OLS regressions and, consequently, hospital 
admissions for people over sixty-four years of age are insignificant.  The time trend also 
becomes insignificant.  The model in column (2) drops these variables.  The final model, 
which is given in column (3), tightens up the specification on public clinical research.  High 
multicollinearity between the polynomial terms for public clinical research is the likely 
culprit for the insignificance of the linear and quadratic terms; however, these terms are not 
jointly significant using a standard F-test.  Dropping the quadratic term dramatically reduces 
the standard errors for public clinical research and the linear term is now significant.  This 
confirms the presence of multicollinearity.  While model (3) is used for the subsequent 
discussion, one could easily use model (2) as well.  The only difference between the models 
is that model (3) gives slightly larger magnitudes for the effects of public basic and clinical 
research while model (2) provides a more intuitive shape for the lag distribution for public 
clinical research (quadratic versus linear). 
The empirical analysis finds strong evidence that public basic research is 
complementary to private pharmaceutical R&D investment and, thereby, stimulates 
additional private investment.  Using the estimated polynomial parameters in model (3) of 
Table III, Figure 5 graphs and reports the estimates of the underlying lag coefficients for 
public basic research.  Each of these lag coefficients is an elasticity and measures the 
percentage change in the growth of pharmaceutical R&D in response to a one percent 
increase in the growth of public investment into basic research.  Only four of the eight 
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elasticities reported at the bottom of Figure 5 are significantly different from zero.  These are 
the first two lags and the final two lags of public basic research.  Using a two-sided test, the 
p-values of each of these coefficients are, respectively:  p-value < 0.006, p-value < 0.034, p-
value < 0.026 and p-value < 0.002.  The long-run elasticity, which is the sum of the 
statistically significant lag coefficients across time, is 1.69.  This is over twice as large as the 
elasticity found by Ward and Dranove (1995); however, the estimates are not directly 
comparable since their analysis used a very different model and data.  
What about the “U” shape of the industry response over time to public investment in 
basic research?  Recall that public investment is a proxy for scientific knowledge generated 
by research institutions outside the pharmaceutical industry, primarily universities.  Scientific 
knowledge generated by basic research is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty with 
respect to both its scientific “maturity” or “completeness” and its potential market 
application.  The newest ideas emerging from public basic research are the most uncertain 
and will appear in the first lag.  With each successive year, these ideas are further developed 
by researchers in public research institutions.  As the idea “ages” and moves through the lag 
distribution many of the scientific and market uncertainties will be resolved.  The latter part 
of the lag distribution, lags seven and eight, represent knowledge from public basic research 
that has evolved through seven or eight years of further development. 
To understand the time profile of the private pharmaceutical investment response one 
must look to the theory of investment under uncertainty described by Pindyck (1991) and 
Dixit (1992).  A fundamental insight of this work is that a firm’s optimal investment response 
can involve waiting or delaying investment until uncertainties have been sufficiently 
resolved.  Further, the theory points out that the value of waiting depends on the degree of 
uncertainty and the degree of inter-firm competition.  Greater uncertainty increases the value 
of waiting while competition reduces the value of waiting.   
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The results shown in Figure 5 illustrate both a competitive effect and a waiting effect.  
The newest ideas emerging from public basic research elicit an initial burst of investment by 
pharmaceutical firms as they try to evaluate this new information, build absorptive capacity 
and compete with rival firms.  This is a competitive “buy-in” effect.  After this initial burst, 
firms maintain their research programs and monitor research progress at universities and 
other research institutions.  It is in this period that firms exercise their option to wait and do 
not significantly increase investment.  When scientific and market uncertainties are 
sufficiently resolved, an average of seven years following the emergence of the original idea, 
pharmaceutical firms again significantly increase their investment in response to public basic 
research.
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  It is important to note that the level of private investment does not fall over this 
period.  Figure 6 shows how the level of private pharmaceutical investment responds over 
time to changes in public basic research.  
The empirical analysis also finds strong evidence that public clinical research is 
complementary to private pharmaceutical R&D investment and, thereby, stimulates 
additional private investment.  However, relative to public basic research, public clinical 
research has very little scientific or market uncertainty.  Accordingly, the value of waiting is 
much smaller and one should see firms responding quickly to new and valuable information, 
particularly when competitive pressures are strong.  This is exactly the pattern that emerges 
from the analysis.  Figure 7 shows that pharmaceutical R&D investment increases in the first 
three years following public investment in clinical research.  After this, there is no significant 
change in private investment as public clinical research “ages.”  Using a two-sided test, the p-
values of each of the first three lags of public clinical research are, respectively:  p-value < 
0.018, p-value < 0.02 and p-value < 0.032.  Summing the coefficient estimates of these three 
lags gives a long-run elasticity for public clinical research of 0.40.  Figure 8 shows how the 
level of private pharmaceutical investment responds over time to changes in public clinical 
research.  
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The results from model (3) in Table III also show that changes in pharmaceutical sales 
and patient demand influence the growth in pharmaceutical R&D investment.  With the 
impact of expected demand on pharmaceutical investment is held constant, the partial effect 
of pharmaceutical sales measures how changes in the availability of internal funds affects 
pharmaceutical R&D investment.
17
  A 10% increase in internal funds leads to a 5% increase 
in R&D investment and this is strongly significant with a p-value < 0.05.  In previous work, 
Giaccotto (2004) find a slightly larger elasticity of 0.58; however, their estimate includes 
both a cash flow and an expected demand effect.  The demand variables, which were 
discussed above in the context of the OLS specification, have larger magnitudes in the 2SLS 
regressions. 
It is informative for policy purposes to calculate the marginal impacts of the key 
explanatory variables on pharmaceutical R&D investment.  The marginal impact is calculated 
as the product of the long-run elasticity and the ratio of mean pharmaceutical R&D 
investment to the mean of the variable of interest.  The marginal effects, consequently, 
depend on the relative magnitude of the measured variables.  Table IV reports these data for 
public basic research funding, public clinical research funding and industry sales.  A $1 
increase in public basic research generates an $8.38 increase in private pharmaceutical R&D 
after eight years.  A $1 increase in public clinical research generates a $2.35 increase in 
private R&D after three years.  With respect to industry sales, each new dollar of revenue 
increases next year’s R&D investment by 8 cents.   
 
6 Conclusion 
 This paper sheds light on the relationship between publicly financed biomedical 
research, which is performed mainly in university and non-profit research labs, and the 
investment behavior of private pharmaceutical firms.  The main question in the paper asks if 
public basic and clinical research complement private industry R&D.  An increase in industry 
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investment in response to public research, reflecting the genesis of new projects or the further 
development of “embryonic” ideas, is strong evidence supporting a complementary 
relationship.  The analysis finds that both public basic research and clinical research 
investment stimulate additional private pharmaceutical R&D. 
There are three other notable conclusions stemming from this research.  First, to 
evaluate how private investment responds to public research investment it is critically 
important to take into account the character of the public research under investigation.  
Depending on the information content and the degree of uncertainty characterizing the public 
research, the investment behavior of firms will be different in both magnitude and timing.  
Second, the pharmaceutical investment response to public basic research is over 3.5 times 
larger than it is for public clinical research.  This suggests that public basic research is more 
important to the pharmaceutical innovative process than public clinical research.  However, 
looking back at Figure 1, it is clear that the NIH has dramatically increased clinical research 
investment relative to basic research investment since the early 1990s.  This trend will 
probably reduce the future opportunities for new drug innovation stemming from public 
research.  Third, this analysis finds that internal cash flow is an important determinant of 
pharmaceutical R&D.  If price controls on pharmaceutical products are put in place, as many 
policymakers favor, pharmaceutical R&D investment will fall.   
 While this paper improves both the data and econometric method used in previous 
research, the empirical findings should be viewed as suggestive rather than definitive.  The 
diverse and interactive nature of public and private research in the pharmaceutical industry 
makes it difficult to pinpoint individual effects and attach causal interpretations.  Future 
research should focus on developing empirical models of public-private interaction that 
explicitly identify the channels of information exchange and relax the strict exogeneity 
assumption on public research investment.   
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Further, one should be cautious about interpreting the marginal impacts too literally.  
The NIH investment flows are proxies in the analysis for all of public research investment.  
Clearly, there are contributions to investment from other public institutions in the U.S. and 
abroad.  Assuming the NIH funding flows provide a good relative picture of basic versus 
clinical investment, the log-log functional form implies the elasticity estimates are valid even 
without having total world public research investment figures in the study.  However, the 
story is not the same when one tries to calculate marginal impacts because these estimates 
depend on accurate figures for total world investment in basic and clinical public research.  
For instance, if the NIH represents 50% of the total world investment into public basic and 
clinical research, a number that probably underestimates the NIH share, then the marginal 
impacts are themselves scaled down by 50%.   
It is also important to keep in mind that universities are the primary performers of 
basic and clinical public research analyzed in this paper.  In addition to the creation of new 
knowledge, public support of university research helps to train both undergraduate and 
graduate students.  These students may become employed in the pharmaceutical industry and 
carry with them the research knowledge and experience made possible through public support 
of their training.  So, it is not possible to separately identify complementarity due to 
disembodied knowledge spillovers and complementarity due to the transfer of knowledge in 
people.  Both mechanisms are probably important and, given improvements in data, future 
research should try to decompose the impact of public research into its labor and pure 
knowledge spillover components.   
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Appendix A:  Data Construction 
Proxies for public basic and clinical research investment are created using the CRISP 
database (Computer Retrieval of Information on Scientific Projects) maintained by the NIH 
and covering the years 1972-1996.  This database contains information on extramural and 
intramural biomedical research grant and contract awards by the NIH and other governmental 
agencies under the authority of the U.S. Public Health Service.  (These other agencies include 
the FDA, the Center for Disease Control, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, 
and so on.)  For each grant and contract the database contains:  record ID, investigator name, 
title of project, narrative description of project, organization receiving the award, address, 
administrative organization of the NIH or other agency, award amount, type of award, fiscal 
year of award, city, and state.  Using a second administrative NIH database, called IMPAC, 
CRISP records were supplemented to include the scientific review group that recommended 
approval.  A scientific review group is a committee of peers within a scientific field that 
review grant applications and recommend applications for approval to the National Advisory 
Councils.   
Identifying relevant research took place in two stages.  This first stage separates all 
awards into three groups (mixed, clinical, and other) using the “type of award code” field.  
(These are codes like R01 for traditional research award or K08 for clinical investigator 
award.)  A second step in this stage requires taking the mixed group and separating out any 
remaining clinical and other awards using keyword searches over the grant and contract titles.  
This finalizes the breakout into basic, clinical, and other.  The second stage takes the basic 
and clinical groups and separates them into the seven therapeutic classes and a general 
category.  This is done is five steps.  First, eliminate agencies that do not fund basic or 
clinical research relevant to the pharmaceutical industry.  This eliminates organizations like 
the CDC, the National Library of Medicine, the National Institute of Nursing Research, and 
so on.  Second, match scientific review groups to their respective therapeutic areas.  Third, 
use keyword filters to further sort those grants and contracts not matched by scientific review 
group.  Fourth, allocate the remaining uncategorized grants and contracts to therapeutic 
classes using the Institute codes.  For instance, the remaining National Cancer Institute grants 
go to the endocrine/neoplasm class; the remaining National Eye Institute goes to the central 
nervous system class, and so on.  Fifth, for those Institutes which are too general to be 
classified (such as the National Institute of General Medicine), allocate these grants and 
contracts across the seven classes in proportion to those successfully categorized. 
The process results in seven public basic research flows and seven clinical research 
flows for every year in the CRISP database, 1972-1996.  These flows are deflated using the 
NIH Biomedical Research and Development Price Index (BRDPI) maintained by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (base year is 2000).  Figure 1 shows the broad level breakout of the 
complete CRISP database into basic, clinical, and other research types in real dollars.   
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Notes 
 
1.  Most of this literature is focused on the impact of publicly funded research that is 
performed directly by the private firms receiving the money.  The current paper considers the 
impact of public financing of research that is performed mostly by non-profit research 
scientists in universities and asks how this research affects private R&D investment.  Guellec 
et al. (2000), in a recent contribution to this literature, find that government funded research 
performed directly by firms stimulates additional firm R&D while government funded 
research performed by universities reduces industry R&D investment.  While this finding 
does not support the complementarity hypothesis, the authors point out that they are only able 
to allow a four year lag in the relationship between university and industry research.    
 
2.  The separation of research into medical therapeutic classes is a similar delineation of 
research problems and solutions by broad character. 
 
3.  Public research is scientific research that is financially supported with public funds and 
performed almost exclusively in hospitals, not-for-profit research institutes and universities.   
 
4.  This definition is more restrictive than the definition of clinical research put forth by the 
NIH Director’s Panel on Clinical Research. (NIH 1997)  However, the NIH definition of 
clinical research has been criticized as being too broad.  (Reichert et al. 2002) 
 
5.  To assess complementarity versus substitutability using investment it is also necessary to 
track how private R&D funding decisions respond to information from public research. 
 
6.  Maxwell et al. (1990), OTA (1993), Cockburn and Henderson (1997), NIH (2000), 
Reichert et al. (2002), Colyvas (2002).   
 
7.  The discussion here encompasses the idea of “absorptive capacity” which posits that 
private firms must be actively investing in research in order to access, evaluate, and use 
public scientific knowledge. (Cohen and Levinthal 1989, Arora and Gambardella 1994)  
 
8.  Maxwell and Eckhardt (1990) find that clinical research played an important role in the 
initiation of 23% of the 30 lines of research in their study. (page xxiii)  However, they define 
the term clinical to mean “…the research was carried out in humans or human material 
[emphasis added].”  In the current paper, clinical research is defined to include only research 
involving actual patients.  Consequently, research using “human material” is included in the 
basic research category to the extent that it did not involve direct contact with patients. 
 
9.  There is an active empirical literature that attempts to measure the connectedness between 
public and private research and relate this to productivity in the pharmaceutical industry.  
Cockburn and Henderson (2000) provide a good overview.  This literature, however, is not 
directly relevant to this analysis.  This analysis explores the relationship between R&D inputs 
and not between public research and industry productivity.   
 
10.  Scherer (2001) examines the relationship between gross profitability and pharmaceutical 
R&D.  Vernon (2004) points out that industry sales serve two roles:  an indicator of expected 
profitability and internal funds for investment.  Since the model used here already includes 
controls for demand that affect expected profitability, the partial effect of gross sales is 
interpreted as measuring the impact of internal financing.  The availability of internal funds 
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for financing investment is important when capital markets are imperfect.  See Hubbard 
(1998) for a discussion. 
 
11.  A Dickey-Fuller test with trend and an augmented Dickey-Fuller test were also 
performed.  The null hypothesis of a unit root for industry R&D could not be rejected in 
either test.  Also, the augmented DF test did not indicate any dynamic misspecification.  
 
12.  Henderson and Cockburn (1996) also found high persistence in the R&D process in their 
analysis using proprietary firm data. 
 
13.  I would like to thank the editor for suggesting this formulation.  An earlier draft of this 
research left the lag coefficients completely unrestricted.  Imposing the polynomial 
restrictions leads to slightly larger coefficient estimates but does not change the research 
findings.  These restrictions do facilitate interpretation, however, by eliminating fluctuations 
in the lag estimates that resulted from multicollinearity between the public research flows.   
 
14.  See Cohen et al. (2002) to learn about the many channels that link public and private 
R&D.  Also, see Cockburn and Henderson (2000) for a review of recent empirical work using 
measures that focus on specific channels like publication co-authorships.   
 
15.  Higher order polynomial terms are not significant for either public basic research or 
public clinical research. 
 
16.  An anonymous referee suggested the possibility that the industry response to the newest 
public research ideas, as captured in lags 1 and 2, could be spurious and simply represent a 
simultaneous public and private investment response to some scientific breakthrough.  If this 
is true, public and private investment should be contemporaneously correlated as both groups 
of decision makers respond to the breakthrough.  To explore this possibility, 
contemporaneous public investment was included in the model but was always insignificant 
with a coefficient near zero.  While pharmaceutical decision makers are clearly responding to 
the most promising research findings emerging from publicly funded research, there does not 
appear to be any omitted source of scientific breakthroughs that induces a simultaneous 
reaction by both public and private investors.   
 
17.  As noted by an anonymous referee, the pharmaceutical sales data used in the analysis 
include sales by non-PhRMA members in addition to PhRMA members.  Theoretically, the 
sales data should only represent PhRMA member firms.  However, since aggregate totals 
show that the non-PhRMA members make up a small share of total sales; this is unlikely to 
significantly influence the results.  
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Figure 1:  Public Biomedical Research by Type:  Basic, Clinical, Other
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Figure 2:  Anti-infective Therapeutic Class
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Figure 3.  Gastro-intestinal/Genito-urinary Therapeutic Class
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Figure 4.  Endocrine/neoplasm(cancer) Therapeutic Class
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TABLE I.  Summary Statistics 
        
 Therapeutic Classes 
        
 Endocrine/ Central Nervous Cardiovascular Anti-infective Gastro-Intestinal/ Dermatologic Respiratory 
Variable Neoplasm System     Genito-urinary     
        
Industry R&D (real mil. $)        
   Mean 2,645.36 2,290.40 2,692.80 2,918.47 729.75 837.79 268.97 
   Standard deviation 1,457.95 771.51 1,179.88 534.89 128.57 298.77 87.11 
   Avg. growth 1981-97 9.7% 6.4% 8.0% 4.6% 4.0% 7.1% 0.9% 
        
Industry Sales (real mil. $)        
   Mean 20,891.1 18,268.0 14,594.5 19,555.0 11,578.9 6,408.2 2,726.9 
   Standard deviation 2,976.9 1,797.4 4,467.0 4,682.5 3,801.1 1,621.4 636.1 
   Avg. growth 1981-97 2.1% 1.4% 4.5% 4.4% 5.4% 4.0% 3.4% 
        
NIH Public Basic (real mil. $)        
   Mean 1,393.99 818.52 593.71 644.62 355.97 23.62 154.65 
   Standard deviation 109.63 149.96 58.10 171.83 21.29 4.47 26.07 
   Avg. growth 1981-96 1.5% 3.5% 1.4% 4.9% -0.2% 1.6% 3.1% 
        
NIH Public Clinical (real mil. $)        
   Mean 1,123.26 769.87 337.20 277.71 109.57 4.90 65.47 
   Standard deviation 199.47 358.15 65.34 186.55 20.92 3.13 13.52 
   Avg. growth 1981-96 2.0% 7.6% 3.1% 15.0% 1.4% 14.6% 3.1% 
        
Hosp. Admission Rates (all ages)        
   Mean 102.14 122.43 199.20 54.04 122.35 7.54 54.64 
   Standard deviation 18.89 31.61 10.22 5.62 23.05 3.44 6.34 
   Avg. growth 1981-97 -3.2% -3.7% -0.4% 1.9% -3.4% -8.0% -1.2% 
        
Mortality Rates (all ages)        
   Mean 19.29 2.25 33.00 3.68 3.68 0.09 3.68 
   Standard deviation 0.50 0.57 3.07 0.66 0.11 0.01 0.41 
   Avg. growth 1981-97 0.4% 5.1% -1.7% 2.7% -0.3% -1.8% 2.4% 
        
FDA Reg. Delay (months)        
   Mean 31.41 36.90 38.27 24.11 25.91 22.49 51.13 
   Standard deviation 22.60 12.53 9.78 8.50 12.68 7.57 23.78 
   Avg. growth 1981-96 -5.9% -4.5% 1.7% 0.4% -1.5% -0.1% -7.0% 
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TABLE II 
Estimates of the Elasticity of Publicly Funded Research on Pharmaceutical Investment 
                 
 (1) - OLS  (2) - OLS  (3) - OLS 
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln Research(t)  ∆ ln Research(t)   ∆ ln Research(t) 
         
∆ ln Sales(t-1)  0.198 (0.158) 0.059 (0.030)**  0.073 (0.030)***
PubBasic Poly term 1 0.341 (0.134)***  0.343 (0.115)***   0.347 (0.112)***
PubBasic Poly term 2 -0.320 (0.081)***  -0.276 (0.073)***   -0.271 (0.075)***
PubBasic Poly term 3 0.045 (0.011)***  0.039 (0.010)***   0.038 (0.010)***
PubClinic Poly term 1  0.109 (0.049)**  0.077 (0.047)*   0.093 (0.046)**
PubClinic Poly term 2 -0.042 (0.029)  -0.031 (0.026)   -0.036 (0.026) 
PubClinic Poly term 3 0.005 (0.004)  0.003 (0.003)   0.003 (0.003) 
∆ ln FDA Delay(t-1)  0.018 (0.017) 0.008 (0.017)    
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age<35) -0.254 (0.193) -0.280 (0.179)    
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age 35-44) -0.032 (0.149) -0.071 (0.141)    
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age 45-54) 0.081 (0.129) 0.138 (0.125)    
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age 55-64) 0.558 (0.176)*** 0.586 (0.173)***  0.571 (0.153)***
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age>64) -0.589 (0.207)*** -0.319 (0.186)*  -0.410 (0.182)**
∆ ln Mortality (age<35) 0.132 (0.102) 0.124 (0.103)    
∆ ln Mortality (age 35-44) -0.212 (0.114)* -0.220 (0.111)**  -0.216 (0.080)***
∆ ln Mortality (age 45-54) -0.061 (0.148) -0.032 (0.132)    
∆ ln Mortality (age 55-64) 0.632 (0.296)** 0.669 (0.283)**  0.692 (0.237)***
∆ ln Mortality (age>64) -0.107 (0.299) -0.285 (0.276)    
Time Trend   0.063 (0.021)***  0.060 (0.019)***
Yearly Time dummies Yes.  None Sig. No  No 
        
R-squared .4066 .3134  .2619 
Adjusted R-squared .1664 .1898  .1860 
Number of Observations 119 119  119 
Durbin-Waston Statistic DW = 1.96  DW = 1.87   DW = 1.94 
Pooled OLS Regressions, Years 1981-1997, Seven Therapeutic Classes    
Standard Errors are in Parentheses.  All tests are two-sided.     
*** indicates significance at a 1% level        
** indicates significance at a 5% level       
* indicates significance at a 10% level        
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TABLE III 
Estimates of the Elasticity of Publicly Funded Research on Pharmaceutical Investment 
                 
 (1) - 2SLS (2) - 2SLS  (3) - 2SLS 
Dependent Variable: ∆ ln Research(t)  ∆ ln Research(t)   ∆ ln Research(t)  
        
∆ ln Sales(t-1)  0.344 (0.203)* 0.481 (0.215)**  0.498 (0.223)** 
PubBasic Poly term 1 0.494 (0.181)***  0.582 (0.210)***   0.607 (0.218)*** 
PubBasic Poly term 2 -0.327 (0.105)***  -0.339 (0.131)***   -0.372 (0.134)*** 
PubBasic Poly term 3 0.045 (0.014)***  0.047 (0.017)***   0.052 (0.018)*** 
PubClinic Poly term 1  0.163 (0.079)**  0.211 (0.088)**   0.172 (0.072)** 
PubClinic Poly term 2 -0.064 (0.040)  -0.075 (0.047)   -0.038 (0.018)** 
PubClinic Poly term 3 0.005 (0.004)  0.005 (0.005)       
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age 55-64) 0.637 (0.204)*** 0.579 (0.253)**  0.546 (0.251)** 
∆ ln Hosp Admis. (age>64) -0.202 (0.281)      
∆ ln Mortality (age 35-44) -0.333 (0.135)** -0.391 (0.157)**  -0.380 (0.158)** 
∆ ln Mortality (age 55-64) 0.856 (0.330)*** 0.867 (0.412)**  0.872 (0.424)** 
Time Trend 0.042 (0.027)      
        
R-squared .1714 .1727  .1648 
Adjusted R-squared .0862 .0968  .0965 
Number of Observations 119 119  119 
Durbin-Waston Statistic DW = 1.93  DW = 1.90   DW = 1.96 
Pooled 2SLS Regressions, Years 1981-1997, Seven Therapeutic Classes    
Standard Errors are in Parentheses.  All tests are two-sided.     
*** indicates significance at a 1% level        
** indicates significance at a 5% level       
* indicates significance at a 10% level        
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Figure 5:  Changes in Private Investment Response to Age Cohorts 
of Public Basic Research
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Figure 6:  Levels of Private Investment Response to Age 
Cohorts of Public Basic Research
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Figure 7:  Changes in Private Investment Response to Age Cohorts 
of Public Clinical Research
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Figure 8:  Levels of Private Investment Response to Age Cohorts of 
Public Clinical Research
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Table IV:  Marginal Impacts on Private R&D Investment at the Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Representing the individual explanatory variable as X, the estimated elasticities, ε, are equivalent to:  ε=(∂I/∂X)*(X/I).  
The marginal effects are calculated as:  (∂I/∂X)= ε*(I/X).  The calculation uses average industry R&D investment across 
all therapeutic classes in 1997 (I = $3069.954 million); average public clinical research for 1996, 1995  and 1994 (Pub 
clinical average = $523.976 million); average industry sales in 1996 (industry sales average = 19227.81 million); and, 
the average for public basic research in 1996, 1995, 1990, 1989 across all classes (Pub basic average = 618.934 million). 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Variable Public Basic  Public Clinical Industry Sales 
    
Long-run elasticities 1.69 0.40 0.50 
Ratio (Industry R&D / variable) 4.96 5.86 0.16 
Marginal effect (real $) 8.38 2.35 0.08 
        
    
